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1. The Soviet Union, while heretofore proceeding with the utmost discretion and generally maintaining a low silhouette in Chile, has now a vital stake in the forthcoming elections and in an Allende victory. Her interests manifest themselves in massive funding of the Allende campaign and in turning a deaf ear to all entreaties by Tomic to moderate the intransigent posture of the Chilean CP which has refused in the most unambiguous terms to entertain any type of arrangement whereby the Chilean Left would under certain conditions come to the support of Tomic when they consider an American puppet. His efforts to reconstruct President Frei's 1964 support base among political center and right of center elements having been totally unavailing, Tomic's dwindling prospects of victory can only be redressed by massive defections from the Left.

2. The Soviet Union is bringing the full weight of its influence to bear to dissuade the Cuban Government from any further pursuit in Chile of divisive policies, increasingly injurious to the brittle cohesiveness of the Chilean Left by widening the ideological rift between the two senior partners of the "Unidad Popular," i.e. the communists and socialists. The issue of violence looms large in the election campaign and recent depredations committed by the E. I. R. are clearly attributable to Cuban instigation and support. Until the elections, which are likely to be thrown into the lap of Congress to choose between the two candidates with the highest majority during the last week of October, Cuba's chosen instrument in Chile, the Socialist Party, will have to be curbed and if necessary silenced. Assurances to this effect were recently tendered to Senator Velozin Yelitelboin in Havana by Fidel Castro personally.

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SECRET

3. As an earnest of its good intentions the Cuban Government agreed to ask the Socialist Party to replace its violence-prone Senator Carlos Altamirano as Acting Secretary General, a request with which the Socialist Party complied promptly. Adonis Segulveda, who just returned from Moscow has replaced Altamirano as leader of the Party.

4. It remains to be seen whether Fidel Castro will accede to the demand of the CP that Carlos Huneez, the Uruguayan who manages the Santiago office of "Prensa Latina" be promptly removed. Huneez, in a recently published book entitled "Chile: La Ultima Opcion Electoral" attacked the concept of "Popular Unity" and pointed out the futility of the electoral process and the impossibility of the left coming to power this way.

5. The new look in Soviet policies in Chile, characterized by a sudden abandonment of a stance of studied aloofness, owes its inception to a drastically revised appraisal of the chances for a communist election victory. Allende's chances have markedly improved and the Soviet Union no longer need be concerned to incur some of the risks involved in putting its prestige on the line.

6. The Soviet Union has been concerned over the health of the UP candidate which evidenced a marked decline during April and May. Exhaustive medical tests conducted in Santiago and carefully analyzed in the Soviet Union assuaged these fears and the decision was made to wholeheartedly support the Allende campaign regardless of the risks involved.

7. Informed circles in Santiago are convinced that the Kremlin recently launched a reappraisal of policies handed down by its brilliant former Ambassador Alexander Arshavin who had staunchly advocated an enduring alliance between the Soviet Union and the Christian Democrat movement of President Frei, a political power he felt had come to stay.

8. The recent visit to Chile by Victor Louis, which passed virtually unnoticed in the press, was obviously connected with that reappraisal. Known to represent the Kremlin's highest policymaking echelon, the impressions gathered by Louis in Chile are bound to have carried considerable weight in its deliberations.

9. From a recent public statement made by Commander in Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider, in which the general committed the troops under his command to abide by the constitutionally expressed choice of the next President of Chile, the Soviets and the CP are known to have received considerable comfort. Since it is now widely assumed that Allende stands at least an even chance to emerge with a second majority, Congress need no longer be concerned over the Army's reaction should it decide to elect Allende over Alessandri whose first majority it has a right to ignore. Since General Schneider's strong aversion toward Alessandri is no secret, the Army as a power factor to be reckoned with, would seem to have been effectively neutralized.

10. This leaves only the possibility of strong reactions by the United States and Argentina to an election of Allende, as contingencies to be concerned about. The communist position in regard to the possibility of intervention by either leaves little room for doubt.

SECRET

11. One of the CP's most influential functionaries and editor-in-chief of its official mouthpiece, "El Siglo," Jorge Insuasti publicly stated before television in September 1968 that his party would not hesitate to invite the Soviet Union to intervene militarily should a socialist regime in Chile be threatened internally, i.e. by armed forces resistance to a socialist takeover, or externally by the United States and Argentina. Hence, a Brezhnev doctrine applied to Latin America will undergo its first practical test in Chile if Allende wins at the polls on 4 September or if he emerges second but fails to gain the support of Congress.

12. A close race to which all available indices of voter preferences would seem to point, may set Chile on a path of prolonged internal turmoil if the CP seriously intends to go through with its threat to mobilize the masses to wrest Allende's election from a recalcitrant Congress.